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Gene V. Crawford and Sherry T. Crawford (the "Crawfords"), respectfully submit the 
following Reply Brief. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE CRAWFORDS WERE DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
The trial court stripped the Crawfords of their valuable advertising permit without due 
process of law.1 When this occurred, the Crawfords were not even before the court. 
Appellee, National Advertising Company ("National"), now labors to justify the court's 
actions and to excuse National's shortcomings, saying that the Crawfords, though neither 
served nor present, had "adequate" third-hand information about the action, and chances after 
the fact to complain, to vest court jurisdiction over them and their property. However, as 
shown below, National's contentions, which are in large part speculative, cannot validate the 
trial court's orders. First to last, each ruling is rooted in the unconstitutional divestiture of 
the Crawfords' property absent that process required by law. Each ruling, therefore, must 
be overturned. 
A. The Crawfords, Though "Named" in the Pleadings of Others, Were Not 
Parties when the District Court Granted Summary Judgment 
Overlooking the requirements of due process, National says that the trial court's 
actions were close enough to the constitutional requirements because the Crawfords had an 
after-the-fact opportunity to present their case. According to National, this is "adequate." 
National concedes that the Crawford's sign permit is a valid property interest subject to 
due process protections. See Appellee's Brief at 12 n.6. 
Page -/-
National suggests this is so because the Crawfords were almost "parties" to the action when 
summary judgment was granted against them. See Appellee's Brief at 1. This is simply 
wrong. 
National ignores four facts that were not, and cannot be, disputed: 
1. National's October 1996 Complaint requested a declaration that the 
Crawfords' Permit was null and void even though the Crawfords were not even 
named as parties and were not served. R. 1-9. 
2. Murray City's answer and counterclaim referenced the Crawfords but, 
again, no evidence confirmed that the Crawfords were served or actually accepted 
service consistent with Utah R. Civ. P. 4. 
3. National then moved for summary judgment on its declaratory relief 
claim. R. 20-37. The Crawfords, who were not joined as parties (no summons and 
complaint were served), received no copy of the motion. R. 21, 28. 
4. Though the Crawfords were strangers to the action, the trial court 
granted summary judgment and declared the Crawfords' Permit null and void. R. 78-
81. Without knowing it, the Crawfords were stripped of a valuable property right. 
Under those facts, due process was absent as a matter of law. See Celebrity Club Inc. v. Utah 
Liquor Control Comm'n, 657 P.2d 1293 (Utah 1982). 
Overlooking this, National asks this Court to deviate from Utah precedent and set a 
new, lower due process standard where service of process, heretofore a prerequisite, is 
unnecessary, and where a court takes jurisdiction over a person who merely hears that a third 
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party listed his or her name in a pleading caption. National's proposal requires bypassing the 
rules of civil procedure and collides with decades-old state and federal decisions cementing 
the fundamentals of due process. This cannot be done. 
Similarly, National cannot change the reality of due process through disputed hearsay 
affidavits concerning whether the Crawfords' former counsel informally agreed to accept 
service of Murray City's answer and counterclaim. The only "support" offered for 
National's assertion is the inadmissible hearsay of the affidavit of Cindy L. Tooms, Deputy 
Murray City Attorney, which recites that Tooms was told that the Crawfords were willing 
to accept service. R. 143-45. Ms. Tooms'affidavit is also substantively inadequate. While 
Ms. Tooms indicates that she spoke with Crawfords' attorney, she does not say that the 
Crawfords' attorney told her directly that they would accept service. See id. Additionally, 
there is no document signed by Crawfords' attorney or by the Crawfords indicating he 
accepted service and Ms. Tooms admits she never received one. See id. f 14 & 5 (because 
of duplicate numbering, see the 7th and 8th paragraphs). Further, the Crawfords' counsel 
stated under oath that he never spoke with Ms. Tooms about the action, that the Crawfords' 
were never served, that he never agreed to accept service, and that he was unaware of 
National's first motion for summary judgment until after it was granted. R. 153 at ^ f 4. As 
a matter of law, Ms. Tooms' inadmissible hearsay, contradicted by direct, admissible 
evidence, cannot make the Crawfords parties to the action before the trial court initially 
nullified their permit. In sum, Ms. Tooms' disputed affidavit offers no valid substitution for 
service of process. See Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288,290 (Utah 1986) (holding that a trial 
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court is without jurisdiction over an individual that is not properly served with process). 
B. The Crawfords Did Not Have A Fair Hearing, 
National next implies that even if the trial court invalidated the Crawfords' Permit 
before they were parties, the Crawfords — later — had an "adequate opportunity" to present 
their case and that this satisfied due process. See Appellee's Brief at 9. National's argument 
fails for two reasons. First, National ignores the foundation fact that the trial court nullified 
the Crawfords' Permit in their absence. This initial ruling is the basis for each subsequent 
ruling against the Crawfords. This in no way is "adequate." Second, the trial court's orders 
themselves, contradict National's argument. 
Indeed, the trial court denied the Crawfords motion for injunctive relief for "the 
reasons specified in the opposing memorandum." R. 156. National's "reasons" (comprising 
only approximately 2 pages of argument) included: "The Crawfords have not provided the 
Court with anything new or different from that already considered by the Court when it 
entered summary judgment against Murray City. The Court adopted the arguments set forth 
in National's memoranda in support of the summary judgment." R. 140. Similarly, in 
denying the Crawfords' motion to reconsider and for summary judgment, the trial court never 
mentions, much less analyzes, the Crawfords' evidence, but again rests on "the reasons 
specified in the opposing memorandum." R. 204. Again, in National's opposing 
memorandum, National's "reasons" (found in about 2 pages of argument) never question the 
Crawfords' undisputed facts and evidence or offer new analysis. Indeed, National almost 
apologizes for its redundancy: 
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This memorandum is perhaps unnecessary. The motions at issue here (motion 
for reconsideration and for summary judgment) raise no new issues. In fact, 
they raise the same issues already considered (and rejected) by the Court first, 
in granting plaintiffs motion for summary judgment; and second, in denying 
the Crawfords' motion for temporary restraining order. 
R. 160-61. 
In sum, National's "reasons" for opposing the Crawfords' motions were that the issues 
the Crawfords raised had been decided initially by the court in the Crawfords' absence. These 
reasons, as the trial court said, were the grounds for repeatedly ruling against the Crawfords' 
thereafter. The rulings did not follow a critical review of the evidence submitted by the 
Crawfords. 
The same is true for the trial court's denial of the Crawfords' summary judgment 
motion. After National filed its First Amended Complaint, which named the Crawfords as 
defendants and sought to enjoin them, the Crawfords answered and counterclaimed, showing 
that their permit was valid and that National's was not. R. 214-21, 229-41. The trial court 
denied the Crawfords' subsequent motion for summary judgment on the counterclaim, again, 
"for the reasons specified in the opposing memorandum." R. 316. In its "reasons," National 
admitted that the trial court's initial ruling was the basis for the subsequent rulings, and 
invited the court to rely again on that ruling to deny the Crawfords' motion: 
This is the fourth attempt by the Crawfords to overturn the ruling of this 
Court that invalidated their sign permit. The matter first came before the Court 
in plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, which was granted. The 
Crawfords then filed a motion for reconsideration; a motion for temporary 
restraining order; and a motion for summary judgment, all addressing the 
ruling of the Court invalidating their permit. All said motions were denied. 
The Crawfords obtained new counsel who filed this fourth motion addressed 
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at the same issue. 
There is nothing new in this latest motion. All the arguments made by 
the Crawfords in this motion were already made in their previous three 
motions. The Court may rest assured that nothing has been missed and that all 
its previous rulings were perfectly sound. 
R. 295. Accepting National's invitation, the trial court never mentions or discusses the 
Crawfords'evidence. R. 316-19. 
Finally, National's second motion for summary judgment argued that not all issues 
were resolved and that the Crawfords' Counterclaim should be dismissed because the status 
of the parties' permits was settled by the prior motions. R. 321-25. National offered no 
statement of material facts or citation to record evidence as required by Utah Code Jud. 
Admin. R. 4-501.2 National's failure in this regard is telling; "undisputed facts" were not 
2National attempts to excuse its deficient second motion, saying that because of the nature 
of its motion, procedural rules should not apply. According to National, because the court 
ruled for National on all prior motions (whether or not the Crawfords were parties), somehow 
National's failure to comply with rules of procedure and failure to offer any facts or evidence 
should be excused. This argument makes little sense in light of the drastic nature of 
summary judgment, and contradicts the unambiguous and mandatory language of Utah Code 
Jud. Admin. R. 4-501(2)(A) and Utah R. Civ. P. 56, which require that all motions for 
summary judgment be supported by a "Statement of Undisputed Material Facts" and citation 
to record evidence. Neither rules contain any exception, let alone the exception urged by 
National. 
National also claims that its failure to support its second motion for summary 
judgment is excused because the Crawfords assumed that the Statement of Undisputed 
Material Facts of National's first motion applied. The Crawfords made that assumption and 
included a response only to protect their rights. The fact that the Crawfords guessed at the 
facts and evidence on which National's second motion for summary judgment was based, 
and apparently guessed correctly, does not absolve National of its failure to abide by 
mandatory rules designed to provide an order resolution of motions for summary judgment. 
National incorrectly contends that the Crawfords did not raise this argument in the 
trial court. The Crawfords' opposition to National's motion specifically pointed out that 
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necessary, even though National was filing a motion for summary judgment, because the trial 
court's initial nullification of the Crawfords' Permit had been the basis for subsequent 
rulings, and apparently could be the basis for yet another ruling. Indeed, the basis for 
National's second motion for summary judgment, set forth in less than one page, was as 
follows: 
The validity of the outdoor advertising permits at issue in this action has 
been the subject of numerous motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff filed 
the first, in which the Court ruled that plaintiffs permit was valid. That ruling 
was the subject of four separate attacks by the Crawfords. The last was in the 
motion for summary judgment filed by the Crawfords on or about August 14, 
1997. That motion was denied by the Court in a Minute Entry dated 
September 22, 1997. 
While the Court's ruling on that last motion effectively denied all the 
Crawford's claims in this case, it did not, technically, end the action. Plaintiff 
also had a small claim for damages in its Amended Complaint. Plaintiff is 
dropping that claim, and moves for dismissal of said claim, with prejudice. 
Plaintiff also moves for dismissal, with prejudice, of any and all claims of the 
Crawfords. Granting this motion should end the action and permit entry of a 
final, appealable order. 
R. 324. 
Overlooking the Crawfords' record evidence establishing disputed issues of material 
fact (R. 329-32), overlooking that the Crawfords were never served with process and were 
National "did not specifically include a 'Statement of Undisputed Material Facts' in the 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff s Motion for Summary Judgment." R. 329. National 
also argues that the Crawfords committed the same error because "all they did was refer to 
all their previous pleadings filed in the case, . . . ." Appellee's Brief at 19. This, too, is 
inaccurate. Rule 10(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[statements in 
a pleadings may be adopted by reference . . . in another pleading . . . . " In accordance with 
this Rule, the Crawfords referenced Rule 10(c) and expressly adopted as their statement of 
Additional Material Facts certain sections of other specified pleadings. R. 330. National 
failed to include any such reference. 
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not before the trial court until after the court's initial ruling, and overlooking the absence of 
a properly supported statement of undisputed material facts and record evidence in National's 
second motion, the trial court granted summary judgement for National without hearing 
"[f]or reasons specified in the Memorandum in Support of [National's] Motion for Summary 
Judgment." R. 348-49. As with all prior rulings, discussion or mention of the Crawfords' 
evidence is absent. 
Contrary to National's suggestion, nothing indicates that the trial court did other than 
rely on its initial ruling (issued in the Crawfords' absence) in making all subsequent rulings. 
The Crawfords were deprived of the due process defined by the Utah Supreme Court; "a 
hearing before a competent court, with the privilege of being heard and introducing evidence 
to establish his cause of his defense, after which comes judgment upon the record thus 
made." See Celebrity Club Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n. 657 P.2d 1293 (Utah 1982) 
(quoting Christiansen v. Harris. 109 Utah 1, 6-7, 163 P.2d 314, 316 (1945)). National's 
"notice-is-notice" argument, offers no substitute. As the Utah Supreme Court has made 
clear, notice does not equal due process. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO GRANT SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT FOR THE CRAWFORDS OR, AT A MINIMUM, BY NOT 
RULING THAT SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR NATIONAL WAS 
PRECLUDED BY GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT. 
National now argues that there were no issues of material fact concerning permit 
validity to preclude summary judgment. However, National refutes itself with approximately 
two pages of fact discussion. See Appellee's Brief at 13-15. In that discussion, National 
Page -<S-
disputes the Crawfords' facts in pages 19 through 23 of the Crawfords' Brief. In so doing, 
National illustrates the Crawfords' point; at minimum, disputed issues of fact3 precluded 
summary judgment for National. The Crawfords will not rebrief here their discussion of the 
facts which they previously developed. See Appellants' Brief at 12-23; see also Appellee 
Brief at 13-15. That fact discussion, now openly joined by National, establishes that, at 
minimum, material fact issues precluded summary judgment for National. 
The same discussion also confirms that the trial court erred in not granting summary 
judgment for the Crawfords. National admits that it did not raise any factual issue in 
response to the Crawfords' motion for summary judgment, stating that "[wjithout any factual 
issues to resolve at trial, the district court was permitted to decide the case on summary 
judgment as a matter of law." See Appellee's Brief at 16. By doing so, National concedes 
the facts set forth in pages 19 through 23 of the Crawfords' Brief. Those facts, supported by 
record evidence submitted with the Crawfords' motion for summary judgment (R. 259-91), 
required the trial court to grant summary judgment for the Crawfords. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING THE CRAWFORDS' MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THEIR COUNTERCLAIM. 
As just shown, National does not contend that it adduced record evidence contrary to 
the Crawfords. Appellee's Brief at 16-18. Nor does National claim the existence of a 
disputed issue of fact. Id. Instead, National argues that, based on the undisputed facts, the 
3National argues that "the Crawfords identify no such issues." See Appellee's Brief at 16. 
Contrary to National's assertion, the issues of fact precluding summary judgment are clearly 
identified in pages 19 through 23 of the Crawfords' Brief. 
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Crawfords were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 17. However, National 
never identifies what "law" precluded summary judgment for the Crawfords. The record 
shows there is none. 
The Crawfords' evidence and authorities established the validity of their permit and 
invalidity ofNational's. R. 259-93; Appellants' Brief at 23-26. National admits it presented 
no contrary evidence. Consequently there was no disputed issue of fact. Appellee's Brief 
at 16-18. The Crawfords, not National, were entitled to judgment on their counterclaim as 
a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
The Crawfords have never received the type of fair and serious review of their case 
required by the Utah and federal constitutions. At the very least, this Court should reverse 
the trial court's rulings invalidating the Crawfords' Permit; the granting ofNational's first 
Motion for Summary Judgment, the denial of the Crawfords' Motion to Reconsider, and the 
granting of National's second Motion for Summary Judgment. Further, based on the 
foregoing, this Court should reverse the trial court's denial of the Crawfords' Motion for 
Summary Judgment on their Counterclaim. 
DATED this 12th day of April, 1999. 
DURHAM, JONES & PINEG^R-^ 
R. Stephen Marsl^ll y 
Steve K. Gordon 
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